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FAILURE INVESTIGATION AND RESTORATION
OF TWO CELLULAR SHEETPILE STRUCTURES
Frank M. Clemente, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.
AECOM
20 Exchange Place
New York, NY – USA 10005

ABSTRACT
The Trainer - Delco Tap - Mickleton 220-38 kilo-volt transmission lines are carried across the Delaware River by two 332-foot high
steel latticed towers each founded on a man-made foundation island structure. Each island structure is comprised of four
interconnected cellular sheetpile structures. One island, suffered a severe partial failure due to long-term scour in the Delaware River,
near Chester, Pennsylvania. The other island exhibited early symptoms of potential failure, also due to scour. The client was the
Philadelphia Electric Company, now known as PECO, acting on behalf of the owner, the Atlantic Electric Company (AECO).

The author served as project manager and principal investigator for AECOM (formerly Earth Tech, formerly TAMS). The paper
describes the failure investigation, including the structures before and after failure, the original installation (1959-1960), the condition
survey of each island, condition of the failed sheetpiles, divers’ findings of an underwater survey, hydrographic studies, scour and loss
of sheetpile embedment. Also described are the subsurface investigation, soils laboratory testing, the soil/rock profile, the probable
cause(s) of failure, the sequence comprising the failure mechanism, metallurgical findings, circumferential stress analysis and brittle
failure of the sheetpile panels outside the interlocks.
Remedial measures are described and the design and construction of the selected restoration/stabilization solution via a crushed stone
buttress is presented. The author established the construction sequence and provided technical liaison to PECO during the underwater
staged construction, which included geo-instrumentation and hydrographic monitoring of an 80,000 cubic yard crushed stone and
riprap protected circumferential stabilizing buttress, over 50 ft high, placed around the failed island in the Delaware River. The failure
investigation, the design and the restorative construction occurred during 1991-1994, yet the lessons learned from this case history are
as aptly important today.

INTRODUCTION
On May 7, 1991, PECO authorized AECOM to proceed with a
failure investigation of two manmade foundation islands
located in the Delaware River. The investigation included a
condition survey, an underwater inspection, a determination of
the probable cause(s) of the partial collapse of the cellular
structure of one of the islands, and to propose appropriate
conceptual design alternatives for restoration of both islands to
a long-term safe condition. In order to provide an appropriate
level of quality assurance to the project, the author
recommended the engagement of Edwin Paul Swatek, Jr., P.E.
to review the findings and recommendations of AECOM’s
draft report and to visit the site with the author. The author

was aware of Mr. Swatek’s expertise from a paper (1970) by
Mr. Swatek.

Description of Structures
The Trainer - Delco Tap - Mickleton 230 kV transmission
lines cross the Delaware River in the vicinity of Chester,
Pennsylvania. The aerial crossing is supported by four latticetype towers. Two 150 ft high anchor towers are founded on
land and located near the shoreline in Chester, PA and
Bridgetown, NJ. Two crossing towers, 332 ft in height, are
located in the Delaware River. One tower called the New
Jersey Tower is approximately 1000 ft from the New Jersey
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shoreline. The other tower, called the Pennsylvania tower is
located approximately 400 ft from the Pennsylvania shoreline.
The foundation islands for both of these towers were erected
in 1959-60 to protect the tower foundations from ship and ice
impact, provide lateral support to the tower foundation Hpiles, create a platform for driving the H-piles and for
subsequent inspection and maintenance of the tower
structures. The islands are constructed of steel sheetpile cells
filled largely with granular material. Each island has four main
circular cells, approximately 66-ft in diameter, with
connecting arcs joined to the cells with riveted 90° tee
sections. A project location map is shown in Fig. 1 and the
original layout of the cells is shown in Fig. 2. Both Cell A and
Cell B of the New Jersey Island experienced partial collapse
as outlined in Fig. 3. On the Pennsylvania Island, Cells A and
B exhibited early signs of potential failure that if not corrected
could lead to a collapse similar to the one that had already
occurred on the New Jersey Island.

Fig. 1: Project Location

Fig. 2: Plan and Elevation of New Jersey Island
The exterior sheetpiles, which have one face exposed to the
river, are US Steel MP-102 sections with ½-inch web
thickness. The interior sheetpiles, which are backfilled on both
sides, are MP-101 sections with 3/8- inch web thickness. US
Steel T2A riveted 90° tee connections were used. These
sections conform to ASTM Specification A-328 and are made
of A36 structural steel with a minimum interlock strength of
16 k/in (separation of interlocks in direct tension), minimum
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ultimate strength of 70 ksi and a minimum yield point of 39
ksi.
The crossing towers are supported on 14BP73 steel H-piles
designed for bearing on rock. The H-piles were driven
through the cell fill. Each tower leg pile group has two vertical
and two batter piles embedded in a concrete pile cap. The pile
caps are tied together with concrete grade beams. The cutoff
elevation of the interior sheetpiles was stepped down to permit
construction of the grade beams.
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Fig. 3: Before and After Failure
Existing Borings and Soil Profile
Subsurface conditions in the area were determined from a
series of deep borings drilled to rock. In the vicinity of the
New Jersey Island the channel depth is about 30 ft. The top
stratum is composed of river silt and sand seams extending to
a depth of about 25 ft. This is underlain by a sand and gravel
layer approximately 30-ft thick above a 5 to 15-ft layer of
decomposed mica schist. Bedrock is mica schist.
A
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subsurface profile in the vicinity of the New Jersey Island is
shown in Fig. 4.
The subsurface conditions on both islands are similar, except
the thickness of the silt layer and the depth to the sand and
gravel layer under the Pennsylvania Island is less than under
the New Jersey Island.
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Fig. 4: Idealized Soil and Rock Profile

C. Installation

Reports of Failure

According to the original design construction drawings, the
sheetpiles were to be driven to the sand and gravel layer. The
design called for 80-ft long sheetpiles for the New Jersey cells,
and 60-ft long sheetpiles for the Pennsylvania cells.
Sheetpiles were to be driven to either the cut-off elevation or
to refusal (0.1 inch penetration under a minimum of 7000 ft-lb
of driving energy), if that occurred first. Because the sheetpile
driving records are no longer available, the as-built condition
of the sheetpiles was not known.

In early 1991 PECO performed a routine aerial survey in the
vicinity of the transmission line crossing. The surveyors did
not note any gross changes in the geometry of the New Jersey
Island. A pre-existing sinkhole was observed, and it did not
appear to have enlarged since the previous aerial survey.
Nevertheless, on Sunday, April 14, 1991, a boater telephoned
PECO to report that the New Jersey Island appeared damaged.
PECO personnel visited the island on April 16, 1991 and
corroborated the damage report. The two cells facing the
channel had partially collapsed and leaned out toward the
river. Sheetpiles were ruptured and severely distorted. This
allowed the fill inside the cells to displace laterally downward,
exposing two pile caps and the grade beam that connected
them. Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 are photographs of the failure.

The foundation piles for each tower were driven after the
cellular structure was completed. These piles were driven to a
bearing capacity of 90 tons as determined by the Engineering
News Formula or to refusal on hard rock.
The H-piles were provided with corrosion protection by
coating them with Tarset, a coal tar epoxy, and with an
impressed current cathodic protection system, whereas the
steel sheetpiles did not have corrosion protection.
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who were involved with the construction and maintenance of
the islands.

Surface Investigations

Fig. 5: Partial Collapse Exposing Pile Caps and Tie Beams

A land survey was performed on the New Jersey Island by
PECO personnel to define the post-failure configuration of the
fill and exposed portions of the sheetpiling. The top of fill
was marked on the inside of the exposed sheetpiles to provide
a rapid means of evaluating new movements of the fill. The
failure surface was established for future monitoring. A plan
of the surveyed area is presented in Fig. 3. A visual inspection
was made of the sheetpiles, exposed pile caps, grade beam and
exposed portions of the H-piles. Micrometer readings were
taken on the exposed portions of the H-piles. Soil samples
were retrieved from the upper 8 ft of the failure surface for
sieve analysis and determination of Atterberg limits.
Ultrasonic thickness measurements of the webs of the
sheetpiles were taken and the cathodic protection systems on
both islands were evaluated. On the Pennsylvania Island a
sinkhole was measured and the top of fill was marked on the
inside of the exposed sheetpiles to track further subsidence.

Underwater Investigations

Fig. 6: Partial Collapse Exposing Pile Caps and Tie Beams

FAILURE INVESTIGATION
Review of Existing Information
Existing information on the design, construction and
performance of the foundation islands was reviewed in the
preliminary stages of the failure investigation. Available
documents relating to the design and construction of the
islands were received from PECO's archives. Additional
survey information for the Delaware River channel was
provided by the US Army Corps of Engineers and the
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration. A
literature search was conducted to provide information on
design and construction practices in use at the time the islands
were built and the performance of similar structures.
Telephone interviews were conducted with PECO personnel
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Divers performed visual inspections of every sheetpile from
the low water line to the mudline. The inspection also
included the underwater area accessible inside the failed cells.
The divers noted the general condition of the sheetpiles and
interlocks and examined areas of potential weakness or
apparent defects, such as severe pitting, missing or
deteriorated welds, and lack of embedment of the sheetpiles.
Samples of soil were retrieved underwater from the mound of
soil displaced in front of the failure zone for soil mechanics
analysis. Ultrasonic thickness measurements were taken at
selected vertical and horizontal intervals along the cells to
determine the extent of corrosion of the sheetpiles. A
hydrographic survey of the area extending 200 ft beyond each
island was conducted with the survey data presented in 2-ft
intervals. The depths of scour at selected sections around the
New Jersey Island are shown in Fig. 7. Scour adjacent to the
cells was measured by a diver using a pneumo-fathometer.

Analysis of Materials
Representatives from PECO's Metallurgy Laboratory and
AECOM jointly selected coupons from the sheetpiles in the
failed area for testing and analysis. A chemical analysis of a
water sample taken from the ponded water inside the failed
cells was also performed.
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Stress Analysis

tensile stresses in the cellular sheetpile structure as a guide to
establishing the cause of failure.

Simple calculations in accordance with accepted procedures
were made to estimate earth pressures and corresponding

Fig. 7: Depth of Scour

REVIEW OF EXISTING INFORMATION
Original Construction Drawings
Existing drawings were obtained from PECO and US
government agencies. The drawings were used to prepare a
geologic profile of the New Jersey Island (Fig. 4) and to
define the original configuration of the cells (Fig. 2).

Archival Documents
Documents received from PECO's archives included the
original specifications for the sheetpiles, H-piles, fill, concrete
and corrosion protection features and the pile driving records
for the steel H-piles on the Pennsylvania Island. The design
calculations, sheetpile driving records and H-pile driving
records for the New Jersey Island were no longer available or
could not be located. Longtime PECO personnel indicated
that additional fill had been placed on the islands in the postconstruction period, but no records of the work could be
located.

Oral Recollections
AECOM spoke with PECO personnel who were involved with
Paper No. 3.17b

the construction and maintenance of the two islands. At the
time of the interviews in 1991, the events they recalled had
happened as much as thirty years ago and no written
documentation of their original observations was available.
The following is a summary of relevant information drawn
from the oral recollections: There is some uncertainty about
the actual slope of the batter H-piles. The construction
drawings contain a note indicating that the slope was changed,
yet a slope of 1:2.5 is shown, which would intersect with the
lower portion of the sheetpiling. Additional fill had been
placed on the New Jersey Island several times since the
original construction was completed. Fill had also been added
periodically to the Pennsylvania Island, but the rate of loss of
fill and the size of the sinkholes have been less than on the
New Jersey Island.
The foundation island area was
predredged on the New Jersey side. Prior to construction soft
sediments were re-deposited in the dredged area during high
river stages. The area was not re-dredged, but excavation of
the silt from the interior of the cells using a clamshell bucket
may have been attempted. It is assumed that this was not
effective and that soft compressible soils were left in place.
This would be consistent with the need to periodically refill
sinkholes at the surface. About three years after construction,
divers determined that some of the sheetpiles in the connecting
arc were not embedded and may not have been interlocked at
all depths. At some locations where short sheetpiles should
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have been butt welded, the sheetpiles did not abut. Also some
sheetpiles in Cell B were not embedded and appeared to be
bearing on random rock outcrops.

FINDINGS OF CONDITION SURVEY
A condition survey was performed by AECOM and LaneRobinson Associates (LRA), the diving subconsultant.
Corrosion Probe, Inc. and Hydro Data, Inc. were
subconsultants to LRA. The original components of the
condition survey were an underwater inspection of the islands,
surface observations and evaluation of the cathodic protection
system. Additional investigations included hydrographic
surveys of the perimeter of both islands, a land survey of the
post-failure configuration of the New Jersey Island and a
program of metallurgical testing of steel coupons taken from
the failed cells. Surface and underwater investigations and the
metallurgical report are described later. The condition survey
was conducted under the continuous direction of AECOM.

Detection of Scour
The divers performed a pneumo-fathometer survey around the
perimeter of the islands at the mudline. The results of this
survey were consistent with the precision hydrographic
survey, and indicated that about 20 ft of scour had occurred on
the channel side of both islands since original borings were
conducted in 1959. Divers observed several 1 to 6-ft vertical
drops in the mudline profile around both foundation islands.
These appeared to the divers to be at locations where current
velocity increased.

Additional Observations
New Jersey Island. Additional observations that may have a
bearing on the failure of the New Jersey Island are
summarized below. The numbering system used to identify
specific sheetpiles that are discussed in this section is shown
in Fig. 3.


The failure appears essentially symmetrical when
viewed in plan. Ruptured sheetpiles in Cells A and B
are interior section MP-101 sheetpiles located under
the North-South grade beam.
Torch-cut holes,
presumably for handling, were found on several
sheetpiles near the failure zone between EI. +1.0 and
+2.0 ft USC&GS datum.



Cell A has 95 exterior section MP-102 sheetpiles.
Other cells on both islands have 97 exterior section
MP-102 sheetpiles, as called for in the construction
drawings. The number of interior sheetpiles in the
cells was not determined as the tops of the sheetpiles
were covered with fill.



Sheetpile 5 of the AB connecting arc is not
embedded, and is only 47 1/8 inches in length. The
tip elevation of this sheetpile is at EI.-32.7 ft. Based
on borings made in 1959 the mudline was at
approximate EI. -30.0 ft in this area. Therefore this
sheetpile had insufficient embedment at the time of
construction. The divers felt two sheetpiles that were
present inside the connecting arc behind the short
sheetpile. However, the two sheetpiles are not
connected to the cell and they would not compensate
for the lack of embedment of the short sheet pile.
Sheetpile 4 of Cell A has a short length of sheetpile
driven in front of it.



A large mound of clay and gravel is located in front
of the AB closure arc. The mound is highest in front
of sheetpiles 4 and 5, where the greatest lateral
movement of the cells occurred.
The divers
estimated that the crest of the mound is
approximately 12 ft above the adjacent scoured
bottom of the riverbed.

Divers Survey
LRA performed an underwater inspection of the island
structures and inspected the exposed surface of the sheetpiles.
The principal findings of the diver's inspection included the
general condition of the sheetpiles and H-piles, detection of
scour, observations related to the failure of the New Jersey
Island and the reason why the Pennsylvania Island was
experiencing sinkholes.

General Condition of Sheetpiles
Generally, the intact sheetpiles exhibited little loss of section
and were in good condition. However, a band of severely
pitted steel encircles each island at the low water splash zone.
The pitted band extends from approximate El. -1.0 to -4.0 ft
USC&G (US Coast and Geodetic Datum). The pits are as
much as 1 1/4-inches in diameter, and up to 0.420 inches deep,
as measured with a pit gauge. The deeper pits can be
penetrated with a sharp hammer. The interlocks in this zone
are severely corroded; in some cases the outer knuckle is
completely corroded.

Condition of H-Piles
The loss of fill on the New Jersey Island exposed between 1
and 2 ft of the H-Piles below the pile caps. The exposed
portions appeared to be in good condition and the protective
coating appeared intact, except where it was torn away by the
movement of the fill. The flange of one H-pile was bent
approximately 1 inch out of plane along a 4-inch section. This
may have been the result of the pile driving operation that is,
hard driving to rock.
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The sheetpiles on the New Jersey Island were to be
spliced by butt welding to attain the required length.
In Cell A, exterior sheetpile 95 and interior sheetpile
3N did not show evidence of ever having been
welded, and there was a 1 inch gap between the two
lengths comprising sheetpile 95.



There were no weep holes in the structure to allow
drainage of the cells.



Angle plates of both connecting tees of the AB
closure arc were torn (Fig. 11).

As a result of the partial collapse, the two badly damaged
connecting tees which connected Cell A and Cell B were
distorted and appeared to be gradually tearing apart, making
the structure of doubtful value. If the two tee connections
were to completely separate, the large radius arc formed by
failed cells A and B would be lost, and the cell fill would be
free to move into the river. It would be more difficult to
salvage and repair the island. We did not want to lose what we
had and there was a good chance that we could. To arrest the
progressive worsening of the tee connections, our expert
consultant, Mr. E. Paul Swatek, recommended that we
immediately carry out the modest temporary repairs described
below:


In order to equalize the water inside the cells with the
level of the river, burn weep holes in the sheetpiles of
all four Cells A, B, C, and D above the water line on
the more or less vertical portions of the sheetpiles.
After burning of these drain holes, they should be
rodded to develop a stream of water. To do this take
a welding rod and churn it around in the hole. The
rodding would dislodge any large round stone which
might plug the hole, and develop a crude filter behind
the sheetpile. This may have to be done several times
before a good weep is developed.



Weld horizontal steel straps, 4" x 1/2" at 8" centers
vertically, across the tee-pile splits - all the way
across both splits. Form to fit sheetpile cell radius.
Weld these straps at 8 inch centers from the top of
split down to low water, using a low hydrogen
welding rod because of sheetpile chemistry.

Pennsylvania Island. A sinkhole located in the NE cell of the
Pennsylvania Island developed prior to the preliminary site
inspection. The sinkhole was adjacent to the exterior
sheetpiles and semicircular in shape, approximately 13'-3"
long, 7'-8" at its widest point and 8'-4" at its deepest point.
The sinkhole spanned the 13th, and 23rd sheetpiles of Cell D.
During the underwater inspection of the area corresponding to
the surface sinkhole, the divers observed that the tips of six
sheetpiles (Nos. 16, 18, 20, 22, 24 and 26) were 4 inches to 9
inches above the mudline. Active loss of fill was occurring in
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several openings whereas the presence of cobbles and gravel
in other openings inhibited the loss of fill.

Hydrographic Surveys
Hydrographic surveys were carried out in order to investigate
general river bottom con conditions in the vicinity of the two
islands and to document scour near the structures. Depth
soundings taken by the Corps of Engineers in 1954 and
riverbed elevations from the 1959 borings were compared
with 1991 soundings. Soundings were not available for the
period immediately before or after construction. Based on the
comparison, approximately 20 ft of scour had occurred on the
channel side of both islands.
The maximum depth of scour in the vicinity of the New Jersey
Island is on the channel side of Cell B. The riverbed elevation
at the deepest point is at approximately El. -49.9 ft. The
riverbed elevation on the channel side of the island in 1959
was approximately El. -30.0 ft. On the Pennsylvania Island the
deepest scour is also on the channel side, at approximately El.
-39.3 ft, compared to El. -20.5 ft, in 1954.

Evaluation of Cathodic Protection
Corrosion Probe, Inc. performed ultrasonic thickness testing of
the sheetpiles and evaluated the condition of the cathodic
protection system. The cathodic protection system on the
New Jersey Island was not operational. An overload trip
feature probably deactivated the system when the cables from
the H-pile groups to the anodes in the two failed cells were
ruptured due to the large displacements of the cell fill.
Potential measurements indicate that all structures on the New
Jersey Island, including the sheetpiles, H-piles, pile caps and
electrical grounds were electrically continuous. This appears
to corroborate calculations and oral recollections which
indicated that the batter H-piles on that island intersected the
sheetpile cells, as shown on Fig. 2. The cathodic protection
system on the Pennsylvania Island was operational and in
service.

Metallurgical Analysis and Failure Mechanism
Steel coupons from the failed cells were torch cut from
sheetpiles in the failure zone and analyzed in PECo's
Metallurgy Laboratory. The principal conclusions of the
metallurgical analysis regarding the failure mechanism are
paraphrased below:


Fracture of the interlock of the ruptured panel in Cell
B started beneath the soil surface and progressed
upward in a fast, brittle manner. This was evidenced
by the characteristic herringbone failure pattern
observed on the rupture surface.
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Fracture of the interlock of the ruptured panel in Cell
A initiated approximately 78 inches below the top of
the sheetpile and progressed upward in a manner
similar to the crack in Cell B.



The web of the sheetpile adjoining ruptured panel
had a large crack.
This section exhibited a
considerable amount of deformation due to twisting
and tearing. The initiation site of this crack was
below the soil level and therefore not identified.

plastic clay, with a liquid limit of 99% and a plasticity index
of 62%.

Analysis of Water Sample



All of the cracks that were observed, including a
small axial tear emanating from the bottom edge of a
lifting hole, indicate a high tensile hoop stress being
applied to the damaged cells.

A water sample obtained from within the failed area was
analyzed by ion chromatography and atomic absorption
spectroscopy in PECO's Chemistry Branch. The pH of the
sample was 6.39, and chlorides were 39.3 ppm. This indicated
that the river environment is not chemically aggressive, as
evidenced by the good condition of the sheetpiles outside of
the low water splash zone.

FAILURE ANALYSIS


The brittle nature of the cracks in the interlocks
indicates either a high energy induced mode and/or
cracking occurring at a temperature below the
ductile-to-brittle transition temperature.



There was evidence that corrosion damage had
degraded the sheetpiles sufficiently to influence the
observed fractures.



Material analysis included spectrochemical analysis,
tensile testing, impact testing, hardness testing and
metallography. The samples were determined to be
carbon steel and their mechanical properties were
consistent with that expected for this material.

Survey Monitoring
PECO personnel surveyed the New Jersey Island to record the
present configuration of the island. A plan of the New Jersey
Island before and after failure based on the survey data is
presented in Fig. 3.

Soils Laboratory Analyses
Sieve analyses were performed on samples retrieved from the
upper 8 ft of the failure surface. Below this elevation, debris
from the slide covers the existing soil profile. The sieve
analyses confirm visual observations that the upper 4½ ft of
soil is granular material composed of gravelly sands, silty
sands, and sand and gravel. The granular material is underlain
by a 1 foot thick layer of silty clay. The underlying fill is
gravel and sand. It is not known whether the soil samples are
from fill that was placed at the time of construction or from
fill that was added later. Atterberg limits were performed on
riverbed samples. The New Jersey sample was obtained from
the mound of soil in front of the failed cells. This sample is
highly plastic clay, with a liquid limit of 103% and plasticity
index of 67%. The Pennsylvania sample was obtained from
the channel side of the riverbed. This sample is also highly
Paper No. 3.17b

In this section a hypothesis is developed which attempts to
explain the probable cause(s) of failure of the New Jersey
Island and describes the sequence of events that led to the
structural collapse of Cells A and B.

Failure Hypothesis
The failure hypothesis was developed from findings of site
visits, condition surveys, metallurgical testing, engineering
analysis and reasonable engineering judgment. A number of
contributing factors suggest that a progression of events
occurred over time, which eventually culminated in the failure
of two of the four circular cells comprising the New Jersey
Island. Conclusions regarding the initiation of fracture at the
toe or lower reach of the sheetpiling are necessarily inferred,
because the failed condition of the structure below the existing
mudline is not observable without the expense and risk of
extracting the sheetpiles.

Contributing Factors and Sequence of Events
The following paragraphs describe the several factors that
contributed to the failure. The role of each of these factors in
leading to the eventual failure mechanism constitutes a failure
hypothesis. The inferred sequence of events leading to failure
is depicted in Fig. 8.
1. Scour and Loss of Sheetpile Embedment. First, there was
scour, probably over a long term. Scour is the process of soil
erosion in which soil particles are lifted, moved and
transported by the force of flowing water. Scour can be a
gradual process or it can occur rapidly, depending on the
velocity of water flow and the type and properties of the soil
being eroded. Washing out or undermining of pier foundations
due to scour of riverbeds is a common cause of bridge failures
(Jumikis, 1971).
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Fig. 8: Possible Sequence of Failure

As mentioned, a hydrographic survey was conducted around
both islands as part of the condition survey. The hydrographic
survey disclosed substantial depth of scour around the channel
side of the New Jersey Island. Scour reached a depth 20 ft in
the vicinity of Cell B. Near Cell A the maximum depth of
scour reached about 13 ft. However, the scoured depth before
failure may have been even greater than these values. The
divers observed a mound of displaced river bottom soils in
front of the failed, sloping sheeting, a consequence of soil
displacement when the cells underwent a large movement
toward the channel. The eroded depth prior to failure was
obscured by the material displaced by the movement of the
cellular structure. Nevertheless, the depth of scour reported
in the hydrographic survey was substantial, and is believed to
be the initiating factor of the failure. Scour deepened the
water along the channel side of Cell B which lowered the
elevation of passive resistance on the outside of the cell and
increased the net internal pressure, adding a significant
amount of hoop tension at the interlocks. With the loss of
sheet pile embedment due to scour there is an increase in
internal earth pressure and a corresponding increase in
circumferential tensile stress in the webs andat the interlocks
of the sheetpiles. Without occurrence of scour the failure
would not likely have occurred, in spite of any damage to the
sheetpiles that might have occurred during construction.

2. Damage of Sheetpiles during Installation. Driving records
for the installation of the sheetpiling were not available.
Therefore, the actual driving resistance encountered is not
known. However, in light of findings of other projects with
similar subsurface conditions, it is reasonable to assume that
the sheetpiles suffered some degree of damage during
installation.
The soil profile in Fig. 4 shows that the sheetpiles were driven
through the soft riverbed silt into an underlying sand and
gravel layer. This layer is medium dense to dense and could
have caused substantial resistance to penetration of the driven
sheetpiles. In overcoming this resistance the sheetpiles, being
long flexible members, were vulnerable to damage by tearing
of the webs or deformation of the interlocks.
The vulnerability of sheetpiles to damage during driving is
supported by Jahren (1990) as follows: "For cell structures,
many failures are due to construction problems, such as rough
driving that damages interlocks of sheet piles”, by Bowles
(1968): “To achieve a cell which is stable against bursting it is
necessary that the sheetpiling be driven so that continuity of
the interlocks is maintained. Small stones in the driving
zone may wedge in the interlock so that the interlock joint
can be damaged or the adjacent [sheet] pile may be driven out
of position”, and by Koerner (1984): “splitting of the web
during driving is not uncommon, particularly when
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obstructions or dense granular soils are being penetrated.”
Initially, sheetpiles and interlocks which may have been
damaged at or near the toe during installation were well
embedded below the river bottom. Under this condition the
internal earth pressure and resulting interlock stresses were
small and of no consequence to the behavior of the cellular
structure. However, with the progression of scouring of the
riverbed, the embedment of damaged sheetpiles and interlocks
was gradually reduced and the circumferential tensile stresses
increased accordingly.
3. Soft Sediments and Periodic Backfilling of Cells. As
mentioned under oral recollections, during the original
construction attempts were made to dredge the soft river
bottom sediments, but were apparently abandoned when new
deposits occurred following a spring freshette. Hence, it is
believed that the cellular structure was constructed through the
soft sediments and it appears that attempts to excavate the soft
silty sediments from within the cells was not successful, prior
to filling the cells with granular backfill. The presence of the
soft clay in the cell had the following undesirable effects on
the structure:


Soft clays trapped at riverbed elevation and deep in
Cell B added to hoop tension. The intention was to
remove these soft plastic river bottom sediments
before placing the cell fill. The considered opinion is
that they were not. They are revealed in borings taken
after the collapse. The excess pressures transmitted
by these trapped plastic clays in Cell B produced
interlock values in the neighborhood of 16 kips per
inch, which is at or above the ultimate value of the
M-l0l interlock.



Long term consolidation under the weight of the
backfill led to compression, subsidence and surface
settlement. This is consistent with the history of
sinkholes and depressions that have required
backfilling to bring the ground level in the cells back
to design grade. Of course, each time backfill is
placed to correct the depressions, the added weight
induces still more settlement and the need for
subsequent additional backfill, which increases the
stress even further. The periodic backfilling increased
the overburden pressures in the cell and likewise the
internal lateral pressure exerted outwardly on the
sheetpiles. This in turn increases the circumferential
hoop stresses.



The location of the soft soils is down low in the cells
and coincident with the zone where the maximum
pressure arises. The soft sediments having a low
shear strength (φ’ = 20º), even after some
improvement due to the long term effect of
consolidation, gives rise to a relatively high
coefficient of lateral earth pressure (K = 0.8) such
that 80% of the vertical overburden pressure is
exerted laterally on the walls. See Fig. 7. Had the
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sediments been replaced with a granular material the
lateral pressure and corresponding hoop stresses
would be reduced, typically to around 50 to 60 % of
the vertical stress.


Sheetpile steel has a low Charpy impact resistance,
especially at lowered temperatures. At some time
during the previous winter or winters a defect such as
noted cracks at a pulling hole or a notch at the top of
a burned off sheetpile could enlarge, and lengthen the
crack. This would create a stress raiser for hoop
tension stresses.



The failed sheetpile was at an interior location in cell
B near a tee. The interlock and web stresses in tees
and the sheets adjacent thereto have an increased
indeterminate stress from the connecting arc in
addition to the other sheets in the cell.

4. Differential Water Pressure. The ground surface of each
foundation island is exposed to climatological elements.
Neither island is paved and during a heavy storm they readily
admit rainwater, which could result in full saturation of the
backfill. Because the cell is relatively watertight, and the
backfill material is not entirely free - draining, as disclosed by
the gradation curves from the grain size sieve analyses,
rainwater could accumulate until the cells are completely
saturated. There were no weep holes in the outside sheetpiles
above water. Encrustation over time made a more or less
watertight vessel of the cell. High storm tides with waves
overtopping the sheetpiles would fill the cell. During the tidal
cycle at low tide, approximately 800 psf would be added to the
internal pressure, increasing interlock tension by yet another
significant amount.
Full saturation would be more likely if the storm occurred
during high tide. Because of tidal lag, the differential head
between the saturated ground line inside the cells. (El. 15) and
the mean low water of the river outside the structure (El. 2.16) would be about 17 ft or a differential water pressure of
about 1,060 psf. This hydrostatic pressure could cause almost
3 kips per inch circumferential tensile stress within the cells
below the water level of the river.
5. Increase of Internal Earth Pressure and Hoop Tensile
Stress. As scour proceeded, the embedment of the cell was
reduced on the channel side. This reduction in embedment
served to increase the unsupported height of the structure,
which then resulted in greater lateral earth pressure acting on
the sheeting. Furthermore, this earth pressure is related to the
square of the unsupported height. Not only would the pressure
increase but with the loss of embedment the location of the
maximum earth pressure descended to a point lower in the
cell, nearer to the locations where possible driving damage to
the sheeting existed.
6. Excessive Circumferential Stress and Interlock Failures.
As a result of the above mentioned contributing
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circumstances, the circumferential tensile stresses increased to
a level sufficient to overcome the strength of the interior
sheetpiles in Cells A and B. A recent reliability study of
sheetpile cellular structures found that bursting is the most
likely failure mode for cell structures that are designed
according to the present state of the art (Jahren, 1990).
The manufacturer's guaranteed ultimate strength of the
interlocks for the sheeting used in this structure is 16 kips per
inch. At this value the interlocks are expected to overcome
the contact friction, letting the joined sheetpiles separate from
each other. The recommended allowable force is 8 or 9 kips
per inch, maximum (Lacroix, Esrig and Lusher, 1970). A

stress analysis of Cell B shown in Fig. 9 was conducted to
estimate the maximum hoop stress in the cell, which occurs on
the interior sheets at or near the connecting arc (TVA, 1957),
the depth to the maximum stress was assumed to correspond
to the depth of scour outside Cell B. This is based on
Maitland and Schroeder (1979) who recommend a plane of
fixity concept to estimate the location of maximum lateral
earth pressure. The weaker the soil in which a cell is
embedded, the greater the depth to the plane of fixity.
Therefore, the maximum interlock tension should be
calculated at a lower level for weak soils compared to strong
soils, and may even occur at or below the dredgeline.

Fig. 9: Hoop Stress Analysis of Cell B
The analysis arrived at an estimated circumferential tension of
16.3 kips per inch under the conditions of scour, saturation of
the backfill above MLW, and the presence of soft sediments
inside the cell. This value exceeds the allowable force (8 kips
per inch) as well as the ultimate interlock strength of 16 kips
per inch. The corresponding stress is 43.5 ksi, which exceeds
the yield point of 38.5 ksi. The analysis demonstrates that the
tension was sufficiently high to exceed the ultimate strength
for separation of interlocks and the yield point of the webs on
the interior sheetpiles.
The cells were constructed in 1959 using MP-101 sheetpiles
(web thickness = 3/8 inch) for the interior members and MP102 (web thickness = 1/2 inch) for the exterior members of the
cells. This may have been done to afford the exterior cells a
longer life against corrosion. In contrast, TVA identified the
interior sheeting of cells as being more highly stressed than
the exterior as a result of the added pulling effect on the main
cells by the connecting arcs. However, the TVA document
containing this information was published in December 1957
and may not have been widely disseminated by 1959. Had
the larger wall thickness also been employed on the interior
members, perhaps the failure would not have occurred,
although continued scour, if not discovered, would have
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increased tension stresses in the future, possibly sufficient to
cause failure. Although the computed values are based on the
maximum depth of scour (about 20 ft), and therefore may be a
slight overestimate, it should be clear that the interior of the
cells, and to a lesser degree the connecting arcs and exterior
members, were experiencing a condition of substantial
distress, sufficient to initiate shear tearing of preexisting
damaged webs and/or brittle fracture of the interlocks. This
was consistent with the physical evidence, above the mudline.
The major principal stress in a cell is circumferential tension
(or hoop stress) and tends to pull the interlocks apart.
However, cellular structures frequently exhibit a non-ductile
or brittle mode of failure at stresses far below the yield
strength. Brittle fractures are usually associated with flaws
(i.e. damaged sheetpiles, torch-cut hole, etc.), are often
sudden, and usually occur without warning. The absence of
gross plastic deformation distinguishes brittle fractures that
occur below the yield point from ductile failure. Low
temperatures can cause a normally ductile material to behave
in a brittle manner. Since the failure was noted sometime
between December, 1990 and April 1991, low temperature
could have been another influencing factor in initiating a
brittle mode of failure.
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In the majority of interlock failures the contact friction
between the interlocking fingers and thumbs holding adjacent
sheetpiles together is overcome by circumferential stress and
separate entirely one sheetpile from the other. However, this
mode of failure was not evident at the New Jersey Island.
Instead the failure mechanism consisted of the steel fracturing
vertically through the narrowest dimension (root) of an
interlocking thumb, leaving it behind and inside the thumb and
finger of the other interlock. That is, the steel fractured before
the interlocks could separate (Fig. 10).

which at this location had already been cut down several feet
below grade to permit construction of the tie beam.
As the two cells failed behind the connecting arc they lurched
outward trying to individually open up, but were restrained by
their mutual connecting arc, as evidenced by the distortion and
slight pulling apart of the T-connection from the top of the
sheeting to a point several feet down (Fig. 11). This latter
damage is a result of the collapse, not the cause.

Fig. 11: Connecting Arc A-B in Distress
Fig. 10: Brittle Fracture through Interlock
The fracture occurred along a vertical plane. Chevron or
herringbone markings pointed downward, an indication that
the fracture began below the mudline and proceeded upward
unabated.

Summary of Failure Mode
Considering the high calculated stresses, the potential for
damage to the webs (tearing) and interlocks during
installation, as well as other random local stress raisers
observed by the divers, such as torch-cut holes and perhaps
unseen welds below ground, the brittle fracture failure
mechanism at or below yield point is a consequence
compatible with the several contributing factors and the
interactive scenario described herein.
With the maximum depth of scour in front of Cell B, a large
pulling force was exerted on the connecting arc AB, which in
turn pulled on the interior sheetpiles until Cell B was breached
in its lower reaches. The lack of redundancy in this type of
structure permitted the crack to propagate upward, as
evidenced by the downward pointing chevron pattern on the
exposed fracture surface. As Cell B was then free to lurch
toward the channel, it pulled on Cell A through connecting arc
AB. This additional stress, added to an already severely
stressed Cell A (13 ft of scour), was sufficient to initiate a
fracture of Cell A several feet below the top of the sheeting,
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Other possible causes of failure such as bearing capacity,
corrosion and vessel impact were considered, but were ruled
out. The origin of the split was not examined because it was
located at a deep elevation in the cell and could not be easily
recovered. Therefore, consultant Paul Swatek indicated the
possibility that a ductile necked down section of interlocking
thumbs might have initiated failure, say due to steel with slag
inclusions, at a point of high tensile stress. But having said
that, he reported that he had seen and heard of many brittle
fractures of sheetpiles, including webs, fingers, and thumbs.
The steel in sheetpiles is subject to brittle fracture at reduced
stress and this failure was one of that kind. The following is
an excerpt from E.P. Swatek’s report (1991):
There was no single event or blow which caused the
failure, rather it was the accumulation of scour,
resulting overloads and weaknesses which finally
produced the failure. It has been shown that the
interlock stress was in the order of 16 kips per inch,
near or above the ultimate strength of the interlock
and/or the web. Although sheetpile interlocks are
tested and guaranteed to a value of 16 kips per
inch, the guarantee could be meaningless. [In E.P.
Swatek’s experience he had knowledge of tests on
some sheetpiles delivered from the mills that found
values well below the guarantee.] That is why a
factor of safety of two is used, resulting in an
allowable design stress of 8 kips per inch.
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Two interlocks failed. The first was an interior M10l near a tee connector in cell B. The failure was
a classic brittle fracture which left telltale chevrons
in the fracture surface, indicating it progressed
upward from a point of origin deep in the cell.
This is consistent with the suspected high failure
tensile stress alluded to.
The second failure was in cell A in a position more
or less symmetrical to that in cell B. The second
fracture was not a clean brittle cleavage as in the
first, but showed signs of distortion & tearing. This
suggests the following scenario. The first failure in
cell B resulted in movement and distortion of the
fragments of cell B. Collapse of Cell B was rapid
and put an overload in cell A sufficient to cause the
second rupture. That this second rupture showed
tearing and distortion of Cell A sheetpiles places
these events subsequent to the failure in Cell B.
The first failure (Cell B) was rather explosive and
instantaneous. The second failure (Cell A) must
have followed shortly thereafter.
There is another weakness in the sheetpile cells that
is seldom given attention in the design. This is the
web stress in the net area of the row of rivet holes
of the tee connector. Assuming an interlock stress
of 15,700 kips per inch at the time of failure, the
stress in the net area of the web of the tee connector
would be approximately 60,000 psi. This elevated
stress plus the flexure stress in the web of the tee
connector are reason enough to suggest that it is
not inconceivable to imagine the origin of failure in
the tee connector with the split crossing over
several sheets to the observed above-water failure
location.

ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF REHABILITATION
Several concepts were explored for restoring the foundation
islands to a safe long-term condition. The restoration plan
included remediation of the failed New Jersey Island, the
Pennsylvania Island sinkhole, and protection of the severely
pitted zone around both islands. Placing a large diameter cell
or steel structure encircling the entire island was not practical
from design or economy. Other alternatives were deemed not
viable. For the sake of brevity, only the recommended
alternatives will be discussed.

New Jersey Island
The failed area had to be backfilled because of the hazard it
presented to public safety. This island is located in a public
waterway and was accessible to the public from two stationary
ladders. Members of the public could climb onto the island,
and through their own actions, injure themselves for example,
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by falling from the exposed grade beam. Unless the structure
was stabilized the possibility of movements of the cells could
also present a safety hazard to boaters who might be near the
structure at the time of additional failure. The integrity of the
structure could be jeopardized since the cathodic protection
system was no longer providing corrosion protection to the Hpiles supporting the tower, and these piles were now partially
exposed to the atmosphere. Future fill movements could
damage the coating on the piles and expose a longer portion of
the H-piles to the atmosphere.
Since Cells A and B were no longer closed systems, much of
the tension in the sheetpiles along the failed portion was taken
by soil friction in the intact portion of the cells and possibly
through the connecting arcs of cells C and D. Backfilling
would create additional instability which could lead to
additional fill movements in cells A and B and possibly
progressive failure of all cells.
Therefore, it was agreed that the sinkhole in the failed area
would be backfilled with lightweight granular material, the
cathodic protection system would be repaired, and a buttress
of crushed stone armored with riprap would be placed around
the island to stabilize the failed structure in-place and provide
a protection blanket against scour. These measures would
prevent further movement and potential loss of the fill into the
Delaware River.
Use of lightweight fill would minimize lateral loads on the
buttress. A buttress of considerable width might be required.
However, the structure is located outside of the navigation
channel defined by the Corps of Engineers, and did not have
an impact on the navigation channel.
This alternative is relatively simple to construct because it
does not require a structural connection to be made between
the existing cells and the rock buttress. This alternative would
be built from the water and the existing structure would not
interfere with construction.
Periodically, bathymetric surveys would be performed to
detect scour and the cathodic protection system would be
tested.
Initially, it was thought that the soft sediments in the existing
riverbed would not provide an adequate foundation for the
buttress and would have to be removed by dredging to allow
the buttress to rest on underlying bedrock. But dredging could
result in destabilizing the state of quasi-equilibrium the cells
had reached. Dredging would also require disposal of the
sediments. Alternatively, cyclopean riprap was considered in
order to displace the soft soil, but it was rejected because it
was questionable whether the large rocks could actually
displace the soft sediments.
Fortunately, in-house laboratory testing for soil shear strength
and compressibility indicated that the soft sediments were
somewhat more favorable than previously thought. Slope
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stability studies using the laboratory strength values confirmed
that in lieu of excavating the varved clay to bedrock, a large
perimeter buttress could safely rest on the varved clays. This
design modification resulted in a $3 million savings and
reduced permitting and construction time.
To avoid additional differential surcharging and displacement
of the island backfill outwardly against the circular ring of
sheetpiles, placing the fill would be sequenced such that the
elevation of the buttress was always a few feet higher than the
backfill placed inside the failed cells. Once the buttress was
fully in-place, the backfill could be topped - out.
In placing the buttress, care had to be taken to avoid
increasing the surcharge and hoop tension in the failed island
sheets that had been repaired with the steel straps. The straps
could take some hoop load but were considered only a stopgap measure - an attempt to maintain what we had. In no way
were the straps a permanent solution. The full and permanent
confinement/stability of the island awaited placement of the
buttress.
Thus, a rock buttress was recommended to stabilize the failure
by placing a crushed stone buttress around the failed island to
prevent further movement and potential loss of the fill into the
Delaware River. The overburden would be removed to allow
the buttress to rest on underlying bedrock. However, in-house
laboratory testing for soil strength and compressibility
followed by slope stability studies confirmed that in lieu of
excavating the silt/clay to bedrock, the large perimeter buttress
could safely rest on the silt/clay. This is to be preferred over
dredging out the clays and disposing of a large volume of
spoil.
Paul Swatek recommended that the minimum berm around the
undamaged side of the New Jersey Island be 15 ft thick and 30
ft wide at the top, and be of the same crushed rock and riprap
protection. Thus, with the exception for a small inlet for a
boat to access the island, there would be a buttress completely
around the New Jersey Island.
However, the toe of the buttress at the level of the riverbed
would pass very closely to the buried location of two 20-inch
and one 6-inch diameter natural gas pipelines. Finite element
analysis indicated a potential for vertical and horizontal
movements of about 1 to 2 inches. It was expected that the
flexibility of the pipelines would tolerate the predicted
movements. Nevertheless, a geotechnical instrumentation
program, comprised of settlement plates, inclinometers and
piezometers, was implemented to monitor vertical and lateral
movements and subsurface pore pressures in the vicinity of the
proposed toe of slope, in order to determine whether the actual
movements of the pipelines would exceed the predicted
values. And they did not.
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Pennsylvania Island
A sinkhole on the Pennsylvania Island was actively losing fill.
Additional loss of fill could cause a redistribution of stresses
in the affected sheetpile cell and lead to instability of the cell.
Accordingly, temporary remedial work was performed in this
area. A small berm comprised of grout-filled burlap bags was
constructed underwater by LRA. Steel plates (1/4 inch thick,
14 inches wide and 20 inches long) were inserted in front of
each of the six sheetpiles that were not embedded. Groutfilled burlap bags were placed in an interlocking and
overlapping pattern to form the berm. About 2 cubic yards of
grout were placed. Sharpened 18- inch long, No. 4 reinforcing
bars were driven through the layered bags (30 bags total) to
pin them down. This grout berm is considered a temporary
solution which is subject to scour.
The sinkhole would be filled with 3" to 6" stone. This way, if
future scour ever exposes the tips of the unembedded sheets,
the stone will tend to choke off further loss. A berm against
this cell at the sinkhole can be placed 10 ft thick with a top
that is 15 ft wide out from the cell. This berm should be of
coarse stone, protected with riprap.
Because scour had played a major role in the failure of the
New Jersey Island, and the condition survey indicated that
approximately 20 ft of scour occurred on the channel side of
both islands, it would be prudent to provide permanent scour
protection to the Pennsylvania Island to maintain adequate
embedment of the sheetpiles. The long term performance of
the structure could be jeopardized unless repairs were made.
Therefore, a buttress of crushed stone armored with riprap
would be placed locally in the vicinity of the sinkhole to
stabilize the structure and provide protection against scour. A
riprap scour protection blanket would be placed and the
sinkhole would be backfilled. Periodic bathymetric surveys
would be performed to detect scour. This alternative is
relatively simple to construct because the sinkhole is still
localized and the cell walls are still vertical. The buttress did
not impact navigation because the Pennsylvania Island is well
outside of the navigation channel. Construction of scour
protection would lower the risk of a cell failure similar to that
experienced on the New Jersey Island. Construction, if done
concurrently with the restoration of the New Jersey Island,
would involve lower mobilization costs than if it is performed
separately.
Based on the above evaluations a large island-encompassing
rock buttress was recommended for the New Jersey Island
(Fig. 12) and a small localized rock buttress for the
Pennsylvania Island. The buttress is shown under construction
in Figs. 13, 14 and 15.
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Fig. 12: Proposed Buttress of Crushed Stone and Riprap

It is likely that storm tides also inundated the Pennsylvania
Island, causing internal water head and an increase in the
interlock stress. Interlock stress computations revealed that
without drainage the interlock stress was a possible 14.5 kips
per inch, with a factor of safety of 1.1, whereas with effective
drainage these figures come down to 10.5 kips per inch wth a
factor of safety of 1.5. We try for a factor of safety of 2.0.
Also, the stress in the net area along the row of rivet holes at 3
inch centers in the main sheetpile web of the tees on the
Pennsylvania Island reduced from a possible 54,600 psi to

38,600 psi, still a high figure. In figuring maximum interlock
values of the repaired island it is recommended that the
envelope of the maximum 10 ft of the values be averaged over
the 10 ft to recognize redistribution of stresses.
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Repair of the Severely Pitted Tidal Splash Zone

Fig. 13: Buttress Topping-Out

For both islands, the initial reaction to seeing the severely
pitted steel sheetpiles in the splash zone was to restore the full
sheetpile section and/or protect the area from further
corrosion. Measures were considered to restore the steel
sections to full structural thickness, such as encasing the pitted
zone with welded steel plates or by forming a 4 ft concrete
belt doweled into the existing cells. Divers attempted to
apply protective coatings to create a moisture barrier to inhibit
corrosion of the sheetpiles, but found this very difficult to
achieve. However, calculations indicated an internal lateral
pressure of only 900 psf at this elevation. Assuming a loss of
one-third of the 3/8" thickness of the web of the sheetpile due
to pitting, the web stress computed to only 13,300 psi,
sufficiently low that it was agreed that the concrete ring need
not be implemented. It was decided to specify a 4-foot epoxy
coating around the tidal zone. Even if the steel in the tidal
zone was eventually penetrated, the buttress would be there to
confine it.

MONITORING
Since the repairs to the New Jersey Island were carried out
effectively, given periodic inspection and maintenance, the
island is expected to be stable for a long time.

Fig. 14: Buttress of Crushed Stone, Riprap and Geotextile

At the Pennsylvania Island, the original 60-foot length of
sheetpiles was set too short. Scour on both islands over the
years was about the same, namely 20 ft. The sinkholes at the
Pennsylvania Island indicated that scour was undermining the
sheetpile perimeter of the island. Future scour may attack at
some point other than where the repairs were made.
Therefore, annual scour surveys should be conducted to
monitor scour. If scour increases, repairs may have to be
undertaken in the form of a low permanent berm around the
island. New sinkholes would also warn of scour.
Drainage through the weep holes should be kept permanent. It
would be well to observe this drainage and make sure it is
maintained. Periodic rodding of the holes may be required.
Drainage is a necessity for both islands to keep interlock
stresses within reason.

CLOSURE

Fig. 15: Failed Area with Lightweight Backfill, Geotextile,
Crushed Stone and Riprap

The collapse of Cells A and B of the New Jersey Island due to
scour was not a unique occurrence. Scour is a common geohazard around structures in waterways. Even well planned
scour protection may be subject to undermining. The
occurrence of scour may be silent, and requires proactive
diligent monitoring, including periodic underwater inspection
and hydrographic measurements.
The findings of this investigation have implications for the
successful performance of other cellular structures. It is
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recommend that this case-history be disseminated and that a
program of inspection, assessment, rating, maintenance, and
effective early repair of the condition of similar structures
subject to scour be established for the purpose of preventing
future failures.
The following quotation was a warning from White and
Prentis (1950), which is as true today as it was then, ten years
before these Delaware River transmission structures were
constructed, and makes a fitting end to this paper:
An inherent weakness of the cellular type of
cofferdam is that if even one pile or interlock fails the
cell is lost.

Retaining Structures”, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, ASCE,
JSMFD, pp. 271-328.
Maitland, J.K. and Schroeder, W.L. [1979]. “Model Study of
Circular Sheetpile Cells”. ASCE, Journal of the Geotechnical
Engineering Division, Vol. 105, No.7, pp. 805-821.
Swatek, Jr., E.P. [1970]. “Summary - Cellular Structure
Design and Installation”. Proceedings of the Conference on
Design and Installation of Pile Foundations and Cellular
Structures, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, Envo
Publishing Co., Inc., Lehigh Valley, Pennsylvania, pp. 413423.
Swatek, Jr., E.P. [1992]. Consultant’s Report: “Failure of
Protection Cells”, pp. 1-23. Not published.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
William L. Magee (PECO), Michael Pietrafitta (PECO), Remo
Farinelli (AECO), Ray Mateer (AECO), Dave Robinson
(LRA), Nancy Byrne (Hydro Data, Inc.), Ed Brylawski
(Geonor, Inc.) and E.P. Swatek, Jr. all contributed
meaningfully to the successful outcome of this project. Also,
Ingo Fox, En-Huie Joe, Dana Wordes, Brian Wai Yan Suen,
Jyotindra H. Patel, and James F. Mansky carried out
significantly important responsibilities representing AECOM.
Weeks Marine, Inc. constructed the buttress, Le Havre Quarry
produced the crushed stone and riprap, Solite produced the
lightweight fill, and Corrosion Probe, Inc. restored the
cathodic protection system.

White, L., and Prentis, E. A. [1950]. Cofferdams, Columbia
University Press, New York, NY.

REFERENCES
Bowles, J.E. [1968]. Foundation Analysis and Design,
McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., New York, NY.
Clemente, Jr., F.M. and Fox, I. [August, 1991]. Consultant
Report to PECO: Probable Causes(s) of Failure and
Conceptual Restoration Schemes, Engineering and Inspection
Services, Foundation Islands, Delaware River Crossing
Structures, TAMS Consultants, Inc., New York, NY, pp. 1-53.
Not published.
Jahren, C.T. [1990]. “Reliability Comparison for Sheet-pile
Cellular Structures”, ASCE, Journal of Performance of
Constructed Facilities, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 216-235.
Jumikis, A.R. [1971]. Foundation Engineering, International
Textbook Company, pp. 702-703.
Koerner, R.E. [1984]. Construction and Geotechnical
Methods in Foundation Engineering, McGraw-Hill Book
Company, Inc., ISBN: 0070352453
Lacroix, Y. et al.[1970]. “Design, Construction, and
Performance of Cellular Cofferdams”. Specialty Conference
Proceedings, “Lateral Stresses in the Ground and Earth
Paper No. 3.17b

18

